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The paper documents the sharp reduction in union density in Peru between 1986 
and 1998, in a context of large macroeconomic fluctuations, structural reforms 
and changes in the Collective Bargaining Law in 1993.  Using a pseudo panel of 
household surveys we find which worker and firm characteristics increase the 
likelihood of unionization in a context in which union density falls sharply. We 
find that a blue-collar job, a permanent contract, higher education and working in 
a large firm increase the likelihood of unionization, but only before the legislative 
change. There is evidence of a breakpoint in the reduction of union density 
probably related to the 1993 change in the Collective Bargaining Law.  Most of 
the reduction in union density can be explained by within- categories decreases in 
union density. However, there is a small contribution stemming from the 
reduction in employment in the highly unionized public sector and from the 
increase in employment in low union density temporary and small firm 
employment.   Using a panel of firms for the manufacturing sector for the period 
1994-1996, we find a negative impact of unions on profits for all firm sizes. 
Within unionized firms profits are lower the higher the union density within the 
firm.  In the econometric analysis, we find a significant negative effect even after 
controlling for firm and sector characteristics and firm fixed effects.  There is 
some evidence that this effect diminishes over time, consistent with the reduction 
in union density during that period, but the reduction is not robust to different 
specifications. This impact of unions on profits is also negative and significant 
when we use within-firm union density.  Labor productivity is negatively related 
to having a union in the firm, but the negative effect disappears once we control 





                                                           
* We would like to thank Peter Kuhn, Gustavo Márquez and Naercio Menezes-Filho for their very helpful 
comments. We acknowledge the efficient assistance of Juan Manuel García and Virgilio Galdo. 
  31. Introduction  
 
Until the end of the 1980s, unions were a major player on the political and economic stage in 
Peru. The Peruvian Labor Code was one of the most restrictive, protectionist and cumbersome in 
Latin America.  During the period 1971-1991, formal workers received absolute job security 
after a short probationary period. This meant that if a firm could not prove “just cause” for 
termination in labor courts, the worker could choose between being reinstated in a job or 
receiving a severance payment. From the employer’s perspective, a worker was effectively 
“owner of his post.”  Unions played an important role in this setting, as they supported their 
members in the event of conflict with employers. 
The nature of unions’ activities in Peru, and in several Latin American countries, is 
crucial to understanding their potential effect on wages, productivity and investment.  In a highly 
restrictive labor market, unions played the role of both protecting the their members’ jobs and 
negotiating for higher salaries, fringe benefits and working conditions. During the import-
substitution period, when many labor institutions were developed, large economic rents in 
modern sectors of the economy were generated. The increase in social benefits for unionized 
workers, together with explicit profit-sharing schemes imposed by labor legislation, forced 
businesses to share those rents with workers. Pro-labor governments created complex labor 
legislation that allowed for the increase in non-wage benefits for workers in several non-tradable 
sectors, which also enjoyed economic rents due to oligopolistic structures, such as the banking 
sector.
1 Also, workers in soft budget constraint sectors (i.e., the public administration and, in 
particular, state-owned enterprises) received salaries and benefits that in most cases went beyond 
their productivity. 
In the 1990s, those rents fell in the context of a more competitive environment, as a 
consequence of fast trade liberalization begun in 1991, the elimination of all price controls and a 
downsizing of the public sector through privatizations and layoffs. In 1991, the Employment 
Promotion Law started the deregulation of the Peruvian labor market. In 1992, a new Collective 
Relations Law was enacted. As a result of these changes in labor legislation (fewer restrictions to 
organizing unions in small firms, decentralization of the collective bargaining process, reduction 
in red tape in the use of temporary contracts, elimination of job stability, etc.) union bargaining 
power diminished sharply. These changes also facilitated the continuation of a downward trend 
  4in union density that started by the end of the 1980s, when Peru was in the midst of the most 
severe economic crises in recent history.  
Very little rigorous quantitative analysis has been done regarding the likelihood of 
unionization, by how much and why union density has changed so dramatically, and regarding 
the economic effects of unionization in Peru.  This paper describes the evolution of unionization, 
showing a significant reduction in union density and in union membership.  The paper further 
analyzes how different variables, which before the reforms increased the likelihood of 
unionization, became much less important during the 1990s.  Being a blue-collar worker, male, 
in a permanent contract and long tenured, were all factors that increased unionization likelihood 
until 1992; thereafter, their effects were in many cases significant although very small.  After the 
Collective Bargaining Law, the only factor that remained important as a determinant of 
unionization was working in a large firm.  
On the other hand, the literature has shown that unions affect the rules and procedures 
governing the employer-employee relationship in organized establishments and that they have an 
effect on firm performance. This raises several questions. Specifically, in a country like Peru, 
with traditional management practices, even in large firms, and an aversion to co-participation of 
workers. First, do unions have disparate effects on the level of productivity? Do unions also 
reduce profits in the Peruvian case as in other countries? Will this effect on profits be correlated 
with the level of unionization within the firm? Here we present evidence that shows that unions 
in Peru have a negative effect on profits and also a negative albeit less robust impact on labor 
productivity.  There is some evidence that the negative effect on profits diminishes over time, as 
the rate of unionization in the overall urban economy decreases.  
 
2.  Conceptual Issues 
 
The Unionization Decision  
 
In the Peruvian setting, the worker faces a decision of accepting a job in a firm that has a union 
and in a firm that does not.  This decision is constrained by the availability of jobs with certain 
characteristics and by the institutional framework.  The ith worker will choose and remain in that 
job if the utility derived from it is higher than in a non-union firm, i.e., if Ui
u– Ui
n>0.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 In other sectors, the associated rise in labor costs generated an increase in employment in the informal sector. 
  5At the individual level, there are two decision levels: to work in a unionized firm and to 
be affiliated with the union.  In both cases, the decision is not in its entirety conditioned on 
individual characteristics and tastes.  Working in a firm with a union will depend on individual 
characteristics and also on firm characteristics, which determine the likelihood of a good 
employer-employee match.  Firms with a union may have different organizational procedures 
and therefore different hiring standards, increasing, for instance, education or experience 
requirements or investing more in selecting workers, as higher productivity has to pay for higher 
labor costs. Alternatively, union firms may prefer younger workers who are less likely to become 
member of the union.  Larger firms are more likely to have a union, both due to legal 
requirements and as a function of size.  
  In turn, when there is a union in the firm, the membership decision depends on 
individual characteristics and preferences for the goods and services that unions provide. If the 
worker values union benefits (e.g., job security and fringe benefits) more than the costs, then the 
worker will affiliate. Membership also allows for access to certain benefits and gives the worker 
a reputation derived from complying with the group norm (Booth, 1985). It is possible that in the 
short run there are no pecuniary returns to membership, but there are long-term returns as 
unionized workers are likely to have greater job stability. The cost faced by the worker is the 
union fee, and in certain cases a different attitude toward the worker on the part of the firm. In 
this sense, membership may be less attractive for workers who hold or aspire to hold managerial 
positions. 
Free-riding complicates modeling the affiliation decision. Some goods and services can 
only be consumed if the worker is affiliated, like access to fair grievance procedures, more 
benefits and better pay. Event though union membership is optional under Peruvian law, 
collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers whether they are unionized or not. This 
was particularly true before 1992, when collective bargaining was carried out at the industry 
level.  
Several individual characteristics may affect both the probability of working in a 
unionized firm or of becoming member of the union. In the literature, women are less likely to 
unionize, as they are more likely to interrupt their careers.  Also, time in the firm should be 
positively related to affiliation. The 1992 Law introduced the requirement that workers had to 
have a tenure of at least one year in order to become member of a union, so the effect of tenure is 
  6expected to be positive. Labor market experience and age should also be positively related to 
working in a union firm and membership, as older workers value job stability more, which may 
be easier under the protection of a union. Younger workers may value union-provided benefits 
less and may prefer to be seen by the management as unrelated to the union.  Married workers 
may be more likely to work in a unionized firm or become a member, as they give more value to 
job stability and fringe benefits.  
 
Effects of Unions on Firm Performance 
 
It is commonly argued that unions reduce competitiveness by raising prices above the 
competitive level. A study of unions and competitiveness conducted by Mishel and Voos (1992) 
concluded that at the general economy-wide level, collective bargaining and unionization have 
had “few if any” adverse effects on competitiveness. There is, however, strong empirical 
evidence that although unions do increase wages and benefits, they do not necessarily reduce 
competitiveness. Mishel and Voos (1992) hypothesized that competition involves quality as well 
as price. Quality is more likely to be maintained and improved by highly participative systems in 
which workers are unionized. Moreover, they argued that because most studies show unionized 
firms to be more productive than nonunion firms, higher union wages are offset in part by higher 
productivity and in part by the reduction of oligopolistic profits.  
Regarding profits, evidence for North America show that unions have a negative effect 
on profits and on shareholders wealth (Addison and Hirsch, 1989 and Machin and Stewart, 
1996), while for the United Kingdom, Meneses-Filho (1997) has found similar results. 
Eaton and Voos (1992), among others, have shown that union firms are more likely than 
their nonunion counterparts to be involved in workplace innovation, especially those cooperative 
arrangements, such as teamwork and production gain sharing, which yield higher productivity. 
Nonunion firms are more apt to concentrate on profit-sharing plans that have little direct impact 
on productivity.  Kelley and Harrison (1992), in a study of 1,015 U.S. metal and machinery 
companies, found that unionized firms were as much as 31 percent more productive than non-
union firms. In fact, even unionized branches of large companies were more productive than 
nonunion branches of those companies using the same technology, paying similar wages, and 
making the same products.  
  7On the other hand, the literature has several examples of negative effects of unions on 
productivity and economic performance. In Japan during the 1950s and in Germany and other 
countries during the 1960s, evidence suggests that poor labor-management relations contributed 
to weak economic performance (Marshall, 1987).  Unions may affect negatively productivity, if 
it leads to compensation practices that reduce rewards to effort (Kuhn, 1998), if it promotes job 
stability, reducing efforts as workers do not feel threatened by a layoff or if it reduces flexibility 
in terms of hours, job description and workplace practices.   However, Kuhn (1998) states that a 
fair summary of industry studies suggest that the effect of unions on productivity tends to be 
positive, and negative effects are restricted to periods and cases of conflictual union-management 
relations.  
In fact, there is evidence that the industrial relations climate influences economic 
performance. Belman (1992, pp. 45-46), for example, notes on the basis of an extensive review:  
“The structure of bargaining, the history of labor management relations, the 
environment in which firms and employees operate, and the consequent attitudes 
of labor and management affect firm performance. In plants and firms in which 
there is little trust between employers and employees, in which production 
workers are largely excluded from decisions affecting them, and in which there is 
ongoing conflict over the boundary between subjects of bargaining and those 
under unilateral managerial control, there will be little incentive for workers and 
managers to share information, workers will only produce under compulsion, and 
the rules of the work site—originating from conflict—will be used to assert or 
limit control rather than improve output. In contrast, in environments in which 
there is high trust, where employees and their unions are integrated into the 
decision process, and in which the parties accept the legitimacy of one another’s 
goals, productivity gains and cost reductions can be realized through creative 
bargaining, cooperation in development of better production techniques, and a 
reduction in the use of restrictive work practices and monitoring.   
 
Freeman and Rogers (1993) have reviewed many studies that show the critical role of effective 
labor relations on economic performance and the dependence of effective labor relations on 
worker representation.  
  8A final observation about unions and firm performance is that the viability of unions 
depends heavily on their ability to transform themselves into high-performance organizations 
that protect and promote their members’ interests while improving productivity and quality. 
Industrial unions that had developed attitudes, policies, and procedures that strengthen 
adversarial relationships and minimize cooperation appear to achieve better results in this regard. 
As noted above, although adversarial relations are inevitable and can be functional, they can 
become functionless if the parties involved ignore their common interests. High performance 
unions therefore will give greater weight to cooperation and will stress flexibility and not merely 
stability through contracts, rules, and regulations. Like the oligopolies and regulated monopolies 
with which they bargained, unions originated to “take labor out of competition” through rules 
and regulations. In a competitive global economy, it is difficult, if not impossible, to remove 
labor from competition by traditional means. As in the case for noncompetitive companies, their 
best option is to stress competition though productivity and quality, though minimum labor 
standards remain an important part of high-productivity national economic strategies. Peruvian 
unions, though, like many other labor organization in Latin America in general, were not 
characterized as high performance organizations. In general, they maintained constantly a 
belligerent position against firms, following the idea that profits were a pie that should be shared 
between firms’ owners and workers as part of a political bargaining process.  Firm owners, on 
the other hand, were not able to develop a less adversarial relationship, so it is more likely that 
the presence of unions in Peru had a negative effect on labor productivity and also on profits. 
 
3. The Data 
 
The main source of data for this paper is the Metropolitan Lima Household Survey from the 
Ministry of Labor, which is available annually for the period 1986-1998.
2  It is a rich data set that 
includes all relevant labor market variables, including the presence of a union in the firm the 
individual works (in which case we consider him “unionized”), and whether the worker belongs 
to the union (in which case we consider him “affiliated” or “union member”).  Table A.1 in the 
Annex shows the number of observations of salaried workers and how many are unionized 
workers from each year available.  This will allow for the construction of a repeated cross-
section dataset pooling all years. 
  9To build the data set for the firm level analysis, three sources of information are used. 
The first source is the 1994-1997 Payroll Data Summary Sheets (Hojas de Resumen de Planillas) 
from the Ministry of Labor. The second is the 1994-1997 Yearly Economic Survey of the 
Manufacturing Sector from the National Institute of Statistics and Data Processing (INEI) and 
the Ministry of Tourism, Industry and International Trade (MITINCI). Finally, information is 
collected from the Ministry of Labor on number of unions present in each of the economic 
sectors as well as starting and ending dates of unions within the specific firms. 
The Payroll Summary Data Sheets are payroll forms that all private formal firms with ten 
or more workers are legally required to present annually to the Ministry of Labor.
3 
 They contain 
information on the number of workers (blue-collar and white-collar workers), the total wage 
bill,
4 and the number of workers (blue-collar and white-collar) affiliated with a union. On the 
other hand, the Manufacturing Sector Survey (Yearly Economic Survey) contains detailed 
information on production, sales, profits and investment of formal manufacturing firms with five 
or more workers. These surveys, which consist of three forms, are carried out each year in all the 
manufacturing companies of the country by the Industry, Tourism, Integration and International 
Trade Negotiation Ministry (MITINCI).  Companies are required by law to answer this survey, 
although compliance is far from complete.  
The first form is applied to companies with a maximum of 4 employees, the second to 
companies with 5 to 19 employees, and the last one gather information at companies with 20 or 
more employees. The surveys differ in size according to company size: the survey applied to 
companies with a maximum of 4 people includes 9 chapters, while that applied to companies 
with 20 or more workers includes 17 chapters.  Specifically, in the case of the of the companies 
with 20 or more workers the chapters include fundamentally the following information: 
 
i.  Working staff during the year; 
ii.  Remunerations and other establishment staff expenditures during the year;  
iii.  Establishment expenditure in electric energy; 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 Except for 1988, when the survey was not conducted. 
3 The degree of compliance is high among large firms, and the probability of compliance increases with size. 
4 One drawback of this source of information is that it is “official” information used to calculate taxes and 
contributions. Therefore in some cases the firms may underreport the number of workers and salaries paid in order 
to reduce the firm’s taxable base.   
  10iv.  Expenditure in raw material and auxiliary materials used up by the establishment 
during the year;  
v.  Expenditure on fuels and lubricants used up during the year;  
vi.  Annual establishment production;  
vii.  Summary of the movement of the establishment fix assets; 
viii.  Maximum and carried out production during the year by main production lines; 
and 
ix.  Establishment net sales and diverse incomes during the year.  
 
The first data set was built by merging firm-level information from the Yearly Economic 
Survey with information on the number of workers and wages from the Ministry of Labor data 
set, then constructing a balanced panel of all formal manufacturing firms that report data. This 
data set covers the 1994-1997 period, which will make it possible to measure the impact of the 
reduction of unionization since the labor reforms. Table A.2 provides some summary statistics of 
the balanced panel data set. 
 
4.   Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Changes in Union Density 
 
Union density is defined here as the proportion of workers in firms where a union exists.  As 
shown in Figure 1, among all wage earners, union density fell from an average of 40 percent 
during the period 1986-1991 to 30 percent in 1992, year of the sanctioning of the new Collective 
Bargaining Law, and then it continued falling, reaching 10 percent in 1998. The fall was 
observed in both the public and private sector.  In the private sector there is a clear downward 
trend since 1988, that is more pronounced since 1992, while in the public sector, there are three 
years when declines are observed, 1993, 1995 and 1996.  In addition, union membership (i.e., the 
percentage of workers in unionized firms that belong to a union) also fell sharply after 1992  
(Figure 2).
5  
                                                           
5 Note that union density as is usually defined, i.e., the percentage of all workers who belong to a union, can be 
derived from multiplying, for example, for 1998, 0.067 (fraction of workers in firms where there is a union) x 0.32 
(fraction of workers in unionized firms that belong to a union).  The first percentage also includes in the 
denominator self-employed workers, who account for almost half of the labor force. 
  11The Collective Bargaining Law made it more difficult to bargain at the sector level, as 
unions involved had to affiliate the majority of workers of the sector and those workers had to 
work in the majority of firms of the sector. The new law also allowed for the creation of more 
than one union within a firm and increased the minimum number of workers required to 
constitute a union to 20 or more.  In smaller firms, workers could designate delegates, but the 
administrative procedures required for the authorization in the Ministry were cumbersome.  Also, 
the new law prohibited workers on probation and in management from belonging to a union.  
Moreover, workers could not belong to more than one union.  Another important change that 
greatly undermined unions’ ability to exert pressure was that strike days remained unpaid and 
that strikes could be called only after direct bargaining had failed. 
Using a probit estimation for a pool of 13 household surveys for Metropolitan Lima,
6 it is 
found that the likelihood of unionization among salaried workers has no statistically significant 
change between 1986 and 1991, as shown in Figure 3;
7 in 1993, right after the Collective 
Bargaining Law, this likelihood is 14 points smaller, while in 1997 it is 30 points smaller, 
differences that are statistically significant at a 95 percent level.  This suggests a breakpoint in 
union density right after the passing of the aforementioned law. 
In fact, several authors (e.g., Bernedo, 1993, and Gárate, 1994) had reported a reduction 
in union density since the mid-1980s. The number of strikes fell from 780 in 1982, to 613 in 
1990 and to only 36 in 1999 (Figure 4), suggesting that the ability of unions to exert effective 
political pressure diminished sharply during the 1990s. The reduction in union activity is also 
reflected in a reduction in the number of “lists of demands” presented to the labor authorities 
(pliego de reclamos) from 1,164 in 1990 to only 179 in 1999.   In 1990, the Confederación 
General de Trabajadores de Perú (CGTP), probably the most influential union during the 1980s, 
called upon its members to strike right after the more drastic economic stabilization programs of 
the recent Latin American history, without any success.  This same union called for another 
strike in 1992, after the Collective Bargaining Law was passed, again without any success. 
The reduction in union density is not related to a sector composition effect.  As shown in 
Table 1, most of the changes in unionization rates are within industries and other classifications 
                                                           
6 The next section describes the data in detail. 
7 The figure reports marginal effects of year dummies, calculated as differences in the predicted probabilities, with 
all other variables evaluated at sample means.  Variables included in the equations were controls for education, 
experience, industry, occupation, firm size, type of contract and a dummy for public sector. 
  12(marital status, gender, white/blue collar, educational status, firm size, public or private status 
and type of contract).  In the period before the Collective Bargaining Law, 74 percent of the 
reduction was due to within-industry reductions, and only one fourth was related to changes in 
the composition of employment by industry.  In all cases, within-category reductions in 
unionization rates are more important. In particular, when we divide employment is divided 
between the public and private sectors, it is confirmed that the reduction in public employment (a 
high union density sector) represented almost one third of the total reduction in density. Also, the 
increase in temporary employment and in employment among smaller firms, both low-density 
categories, independently contributed almost a third to the overall reduction.  In the period 1993-
1998, only the further increase in temporary employment had a role in explaining the further 
reduction in union density. Aside from that, all reductions in the post-Collective Bargaining Law 
years were within categories. 
 
4.2 Who is (and was) Unionized  
 
Table 2 shows sample means for different categories of workers using the datasets for 
Metropolitan Lima and Urban Peru.  Unionized workers are more likely to be more educated, 
older, and with significantly longer tenures than non-unionized workers. They are also more 
likely to work in a large firm and to have a permanent contract.   When are union members are 
compared with nonmembers  (among those who work in a unionized firm), the pattern is similar; 
however, members are more likely to be blue-collar workers. Also, raw earnings are higher for 
non-members after the labor reforms. 
We assume that the difference in utility between working in a unionized firm and in a 
non-union firm varies with individual characteristics, preferences, firm characteristics and 
institutional arrangements that affect the costs and benefits of each alternative.  The probability 
that an individual works in a unionized job is represented by 
 
i i i i X X u ε π π + + = 2 2 1 1  
 
where u is the reduced form of the unobserved utility gain from working in a unionized firm or  
belonging to a union for worker  i,  X1 is a vector of individual and X2 is a vector of firm 
characteristics. To be observed as a wage earning worker, there is a prior decision of 
  13participating as such in the labor market, as opposed to work as self-employed. In order to take 
into account the bias in the coefficient that may arise from non-random selection into a salaried 
job, first stage probit regressions are estimated for the decision to working as a salaried worker; 
they are then used to correct for self selection in the unionization probits. 
Probit estimations were carried out for three sub-periods, 1986-1987, 1989-1992 and 
1993-1998, pooling yearly cross sections in each case.  The first is a short period of fast 
economic growth, the second is a period of sharp economic recession, both before the change in 
labor legislation and the launching of other structural reforms, and the latter a period of growth 
after structural reforms. Results are shown in Table 3.  Blue-collar workers and public sector 
workers are more likely to work in a unionized firm, although the size of the effect falls sharply 
after 1993.  Those with higher education are more likely to belong to a union, although the effect 
is significant only during the post-reform period.  Also, as expected, workers with more potential 
experience, and workers with longer tenures in a firm also have a higher likelihood of working in 
a unionized firm. Again, the effect is much smaller after the reforms.   
Working in a large and in a medium sized firm also increases the likelihood of 
unionization and the effect also falls clearly after 1993.  Having a permanent or temporary job—
both formal worker categories—increase the likelihood with respect to workers that do not have 
any contract, the likelihood being slightly higher for temporary workers.  However, after the 
legislative changes, temporary workers have a clearly lower probability of working in a 
unionized firm. During the 1990s the deregulation of the labor market facilitated the use of these 
contracts. For employers it was easier to deter temporary workers from forming a union.  Even if 
they have the legal right to do so, the employer had the possibility of just not renewing the 
contract if the worker chose to affiliate with a union.   In fact, the use of temporary fixed-term 
contracts increased sharply in Peru during the 1990s. 
The previous results were replicated using similar regressions estimated year by year. 
The two panels in Figure 5 show the estimated marginal effects of different variables over time.  
The similarity of the results of these yearly estimations indicates that the results are not an 
artifact of pooling the data in subperiods.  
Among those who work in a unionized firm, not all are members of the union.  As 
mentioned above, membership may give workers certain benefits, such as protection of their 
rights, better working conditions and more benefits and a group reputation derived from 
  14complying with the group norm.  However, membership is voluntary, and collective bargaining 
agreements apply to all workers independently of whether they are unionized. Table 4 shows the 
result of a probit estimation to analyze the characteristics that drive union affiliation, conditional 
on working in a unionized firm.  Again, blue-collar workers are more likely to be affiliated.  
However, there seems to be a clear negative effect of education on the likelihood of union 
membership. Among these workers, everyone has some type of contract, as unionized firms are 
all formal firms,
8 but the likelihood of affiliation is higher for those with permanent contracts.   
Workers with more experience and tenure are also more likely to be affiliated with a union. 
Summarizing, the reduction in union bargaining power and the increase in the 
requirements imposed by the 1992 Law in order to form a union reduced the availability of jobs 
in unionized firms for most types of workers.  
 
4.3. Impact of Unions on Firm Performance 
 
Following Clark (1980), Machin and Wadhani (1991) and Black and Lynch (1997), this paper 
measures the effects of unions on economic performance. In general, the presence of unions in a 
firm leads to a different structure of incentives for management and hence to changes in both 
managerial behavior and company performance. The analysis to be conducted here mainly seeks 
to determine whether unionization will impact a firm’s performance negatively. Based on a 
group of performance measures, the empirical approach consists of two stages. The first stage 
consists of a simple statistical analysis to study the performance changes of the firms with and 
without unions. The second stage involves a regression analysis in which the differences between 
firms, the sectors to which they belong, and the competition structure that they face are 
controlled for.  
The statistical analysis, following Boubakri and Cosset (1998), consists first of 
computing the performance variables for each company for the years for which we have 
information. Firms are then divided into those with unions and those without unions, and means 
are computed for each performance variable for the unionized and the nonunionized firms. Once 
means are calculated, differences between unionized and nonunionized firms will be calculated:   
 
                                                           
8 Strictly speaking however, there is informality even in firms where there is a union, as there is some degree of 
informal employment in medium-sized firms and marginally in large firms (Saavedra and Maruyama, 1999). 
  15] [
unionized non unionized P P P
− − = ∆              (1) 
 
In the simplest possible model to capture the effect on performance with no regressors, 
performance in firm i during period t depends only on the union dummy, 
 
0 ) / ( E        , , , , , = + + = t i t i t i t i t i Union u u Union P γ α          (2) 
 
Coefficients in this specification are likely to be biased for two reasons. First, the two 
types of firms may have different characteristics and, thus, different performance behavior 
unrelated to their union status. Second, differences between unionized and non-unionized firms 
may be simply capturing differences in performance across time. In a more complete 
specification regressors are added to the model that will control for observable characteristics at 
the firm level, and sectoral and macroeconomic variables are also included that will try to 
capture these shocks.  Further included is a variable to measure the intensity of unionization 
(percentage of workers) as a way to capture the impact of within-firm density on performance. In 
the regression analysis for each of the performance indicators, different specifications are used 
based on: 
 
Pi,t = f(Xit,, Unionit , Sjt  , Yt  ,Di )         (3) 
 
where Pi,t are the different performance measures for firm i in period t.  Specifically analyzed are 
the effects of union on labor productivity and the rate of return on sales.  Xit are firm 
characteristics, such as firm size (approximated by the number of employees), firm sector, 
number of blue collar and white collar workers, the percentage of the firm’s output that is 
exported, age of the firm in years, capital labor ratio, the wage bill and advertising as a 
proportion of sales.   Unionit is the union dummy, which could change over time, and Sjt are 4-
digit level SIIC industry level variables.  Sjt includes the degree of concentration of the industry, 
and the proportion of imports with respect to total domestic consumption. Di are sector or firm 
fixed effects, depending on the specifications, which allows to control for unobserved time-
invariant characteristics and Yt are year effects. An alternative specification uses 
 
  16Pi,t = f(Xit,, Union Densityit , Sj t  ,Yt ,Di)          (4) 
 
where Union Density is the percentage of firm workers that are members of the union,
9 a figure 
that may vary over time. Equations (3) and (4) are estimated using OLS on the 1994-1996 panel 
of manufacturing firms described in the data section. The empirical results are presented below. 
Table 5 shows raw means for performance indicators and other firm-level variables.  It 
suggests that nonunion firms are clearly more profitable, and the gap between the two types of 
firms and its significance increases with firm size. Medium and large union firms have a 
statistically significant advantage in labor productivity (gross value of production per worker).  
These first differences await econometric analysis, but they may reflect the observed differences 
in capital intensity per employee and value of physical assets per unit of value added, indicators 
which are clearly higher among union firms irrespective of its size.  Consistently, these firms 
consume more electricity per worker and also have a higher use of installed capacity. Finally, 
raw differences in wages show that salaries are significantly higher in union firms, differences 
that appear to increase with firm size. A more detailed analysis of two performance variables, 
labor productivity and the rate of return on sales, will be carried out below. 
 
Effects on Labor Productivity 
 
As mentioned above, the first difference analysis shows that labor productivity is higher among 
larger union firms. Figure 6 further explores this issue, using instead the within-firm unionization 
rate in order to capture the possible effect of heterogeneity in union intensity may have.
10 The 
size of the circles represents the proportion of companies in each bracket of unionization rate. 
Panel A shows that labor productivity is larger in firms with higher union densities, although the 
difference seems to be only between firms with a density smaller than 20 percent and the rest. 
Dividing the sample by firm size, it is found that among small firms, of fewer than 49 employees 
(Panel B), there is a negative effect on labor productivity as the rate of unionization increases. 
Moreover, the negative effect is clearly bigger at the highest rate of unionization. In the case of 
medium size firms the effect is not clear. However, among large firms (Panel D) there is a clear 
                                                           
9 Note that for the period of analysis, 1995-1997, industry level bargaining was not possible, so membership was 
limited to unions established at the firm level. 
10 The within-firm rates of unionization (or union intensity) go from 1 to 5 and correspond to union densities of ]0-
20],]20,30],]30-40],]40-50] and 50% or more employees unionized, respectively. Only firms with a union are 
included in this analysis.  
  17positive effect on labor productivity as the rate of unionization increases. In the last two cases, 
there is a homogeneous distribution of companies along the different rates of unionization. This 
differs from what happens in the small firms, as most of them have high unionization rates. 
Table 6 estimates specification (3) using OLS to validate the impact of unions on labor 
productivity controlling for firm characteristics and the market structure of the sector where 
firms operate. As shown, the impact of the union dummy is negative in basic specifications, but 
disappears as certain firm-specific variables and sector variables are included. In addition, the 
interaction of the union dummy with firm size, which could have confirmed the relationship 
between the union productivity effect and size, also loses significance as more firm and sector 
controls are included.  
Table 7 shows the results of using specification (4), including instead of a union dummy 
the within-firm unionization rate. As in the previous specification, the interaction effect of 
unions and firm size disappears as firm and sector-specific controls are included.  However, the 
average effect across time keeps its significance in all of the six models presented. There is a 
negative relationship between union intensity and labor productivity,
11 which is robust to the 
introduction of firm-level observables and also sector-level fixed effects, but it is absorbed once 
firm-level fixed effects are included. There are two other interesting results. First, the four-firm 
concentration index, as a proxy of the competitive environment, always has a positive and 
significant sign. A possible explanation is that, in oligopolistic sectors, competition drives the 
permanent introduction of better production techniques, which in turn increase labor 
productivity; alternatively, it could be reflecting the effect of concentration on product prices, 
which increases dollar output measures. Second, the capital labor index is positive and 
significant in all specifications, confirming a positive relationship between capital intensity and 
labor productivity.  Capital intensity might also be endogenous, as firms with higher union 
densities may choose more capital-intensive techniques. In fact, as shown in Table 5, two 
indicators of capital intensity (capital labor ratio and electricity expenditure per worker) show a 
significantly higher value in unionized firms with respect to non-unionized firms. Moreover, 
                                                           
11 On the other hand is clear that input ratios will have for each sector different effects on productivity, so that the 
estimated union effect may also depend on parameter differences and the level of the input ratios at which the 
union/nonunion comparison takes place. 
 
  18Figure 7 shows a clear positive relation between union intensity and capital intensity regardless 
of the size of the firm. Within firm sizes, however, the effect tends to be non-linear. 
 
Effects on Profits (Rate of Return over Sales) 
 
One of the most important findings from U.S. research has been that unionization is associated 
with markedly lower profitability (see Belman, 1992 for a summary of 11 U.S. studies). A 
similar pattern has been found for United Kingdom. The main explanation to this result is that 
the effect of unions on wages exceeds the possible positive effect of unions on productivity. A 
case in which the opposite result is found is the study of Morishima (1991) for Japanese firms.  
As previously mentioned, a simple first difference analysis (see Table 5) suggests a 
negative impact of unions on profits. Figure 8 analyzes differences in average profit within 
unionized firms. Within all firm sizes, group profits are lower the higher the union density in the 
firm. Tables 8 and 9 present alternative specifications of equations 3 and 4, first using a dummy 
variable for the presence of unions and then using the within-firm union density variable. In both 
cases, there is a negative and significant effect of unions on profits across all specifications, an 
effect that is robust to the introduction of both sector and firm fixed effects. 
In general, the evidence points to a sizeable negative effect of unionization on profits. 
When using a union dummy, Table 8 suggests a that the return on sales is, on average, 19 percent 
lower in unionized firms, an effect that is reduced by approximately four percentage points when 
firm and sector control variables are included.  In the estimation where firm level fixed effects 
are included, the negative effect on profits is 17.5 percent.   Moreover, the results suggest that 
during the three years of the sample the impact of unions on profits diminishes, although it is still 
significant. This can be explained as a consequence of the changes in the unionization 
legislation, which reduced union power and therefore its impact on profits.  However, in the 
specification where firm fixed effects are introduced, the year dummies lose their significance. 
The impact of unions on profits is also negative and significant when within-firm union 
intensity is used instead of a dummy variable (see Table 9). The magnitude of the effect falls as 
controls are introduced, but the effect is still large.  In this case only the 1995 interaction is 
significant, and again, time effects cannot be identified in the firm-level fixed effects 
specification. Similarly to what was found with labor productivity, the impact of industry 
concentration is positive and significant in explaining the rate of return over sales. Capital 
  19intensity however, has a negative effect. It is therefore clear from the evidence presented here 
that unionized firms earn substantially lower returns than their non-union counterparts. The 
results also show a negative, albeit less robust impact on labor productivity, and there is also 
evidence that unionized firms are more capital intensive.  
 
5.   Summary and Final Comments 
 
There is evidence of a clear reduction in union density right after the passage of the Collective 
Bargaining Law in 1992.  Holding constant worker and firm observable characteristics, the 
unionization likelihood diminished sharply since 1993. Being a blue-collar worker, male, in a 
permanent contract and long tenured, increased unionization likelihood until 1992; thereafter, the 
effects of these characteristics were in many cases significant but very small. The only factor that 
remained important as a determinant of union status was working in a large firm. When the 
reduction in union density is decomposed, it is found that most of the reduction is observed 
within categories, and the reduction in union density is not related to a sector composition effect.  
However, before the change in collective bargaining legislation, reductions in public 
employment, a high union density sector, contributed almost one third to the total reduction in 
density. The increase in temporary employment and in employment in small firms, both low 
union density sectors, also contributed to the overall reduction.  But in the period 1993-1998, 
after the reforms in the labor market, only the further increase in temporary employment had a 
small role in explaining the further reduction in union density, and most of the changes were 
observed within categories and economic sector. 
With respect to the impact of unions on firm performance, a simple first difference 
analysis finds a negative impact of unions on profits for all firm sizes.  Within unionized firms, 
profits are lower the higher the union density in the firm.  The econometric analysis finds a 
robust negative effect of 17.5 percent even after controlling for firm and sector characteristics 
and firm fixed effects.  There is some evidence that this effect diminishes over time, which is 
consistent with the fact that the unionization showed a sharp reduction and unions saw their 
power diminished, partially as a consequence of the Collective Bargaining Law of 1993.   
However, the reduction in the negative union effect could not be confirmed in all specifications. 
This impact of unions on profits is also negative and significant when within-firm union intensity 
is used instead of a union dummy.  The magnitude of the effect falls as controls are introduced, 
  20but the effect is still large. Overall, there is clear evidence that unionized firms earn substantially 
lower returns than their non-union counterparts.  
 As far as other measures of performance are concerned, labor productivity is negatively 
related to having a union in the firm, although the negative effect disappears once firm 
characteristics, particularly capital intensity, are controlled for.  Capital intensity is clearly higher 
among unionized firms and is also higher among firms with higher within-firm union density. A 
negative effect on productivity may be related to the history of conflictual labor management 
relations. Management and unions were in many cases suspicious of each other’s objectives and 
strategies. The high degree of politicization of unions, and the infiltration of terrorist groups in 
many large unions in the manufacturing sector during the 1980s, led to a situation of very little 
trust, with no incentives to work cooperatively to improve working conditions or improve 
production techniques. 
Summarizing, the evidence derived from the analysis is consistent with a bargaining 
model of union-firm interaction in which the union clearly affects profits negatively and has a 
negative, albeit not statistically significant, effect on labor productivity.  The negative effect on 
profits, with a small or nil effect on productivity, explains the strong opposition of firms in Peru 
to a revival of a union movement.  Clearly, the possibility of unions’ having a positive effect on 
productivity, which could in turn lead to higher rates of investment and productivity growth, 
implies a fundamental change in labor-management relations in Peru.  
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1/. Shows the percentage of workers in unionized firms that belong to a union 
Source: Household Survey, Ministry of Labor-INEI. 
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1/. The vertical lines show confidence intervals at 95% of significance. 
 
Note: Marginal effects take as base year 1993. 
Excludes 1996 because of problems with the data for type of worker. 


























































































































































Table 1. Decomposition of Changes in Unionization Rate (%) 
 
 
Between Effect  Within effect Interaction Between Effect  Within effect Interaction
Marital Status 1.15 99.08 -0.24 2.72 100.09 -2.80
Gender 0.00 100.02 -0.02 -1.34 101.08 0.26
Blue/White Collar 2.82 93.08 4.10 1.15 98.48 0.37
Public/Private Sector 27.69 61.25 11.06 14.33 89.61 -3.94
Education -2.44 107.56 -5.11 -0.23 101.05 -0.83
Firm Size 28.62 69.26 2.12 3.82 99.01 -2.82
Contract 35.92 57.60 6.48 35.66 72.98 -8.64
Full/Part Time 0.94 100.59 -1.53 3.33 95.78 0.89
Industry 28.90 74.09 -2.99 12.45 92.73 -5.19
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Table 2. 
Metropolitan Lima: Means and Deviations of Variables by Union and Union Membership 1986-1998 
 
 
Total Firms without union Firms with union Total Firms without union Total Firms without union
Salaried Salaried Total Non members Members Salaried Total Non members
Real wage (soles of 1994) 836.45 698.88 1038.33 404.98 374.18 456.82 499.02 499.02 592.70 557.08 737.47 777.29
(908.2) (811.64) (1000.01) (618.3) (660.63) (535.64) (641.9) (419.37) (838.35) (821.75) (888.12) (1031.45)
Married 0.54 0.46 0.66 0.54 0.48 0.65 0.56 0.56 0.49 0.47 0.61 0.51
(0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.44) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49)
Male 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.65
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47)
Blue collar worker 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.34 0.36 0.26 0.24
(0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.48) (0.43) (0.4) (0.45) (0.47) (0.48) (0.43) (0.42)
Public sector 0.29 0.15 0.49 0.27 0.11 0.53 0.45 0.45 0.18 0.11 0.50 0.46
(0.45) (0.35) (0.49) (0.44) (0.31) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.38) (0.3) (0.49) (0.49)
Secondary education 0.54 0.60 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.55 0.36 0.36
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47)
Higher education 0.31 0.25 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.39 0.36 0.54 0.57
(0.46) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49)
Medium size firm 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24)
Large firm 0.49 0.26 0.83 0.48 0.24 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.40 0.28 0.86 0.84
(0.49) (0.43) (0.37) (0.49) (0.42) (0.33) (0.35) (0.32) (0.48) (0.45) (0.35) (0.36)
Permanent contract 0.61 0.45 0.84 0.58 0.43 0.83 0.69 0.69 0.43 0.35 0.75 0.63
(0.48) (0.49) (0.36) (0.49) (0.49) (0.37) (0.46) (0.2) (0.49) (0.47) (0.43) (0.48)
Temporary contract 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.25
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.3) (0.29) (0.36) (0.2) (0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.43)
Part time 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.25 0.23
(0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.37) (0.43) (0.42)
Tenure 7.01 4.62 10.55 7.00 4.81 10.68 7.04 7.04 5.21 4.14 9.59 6.36
(8.23) (6.46) (9.23) (8.17) (6.46) (9.34) (8.04) (9.23) (7.17) (6.21) (8.95) (7.59)
Potential experience 16.73 14.59 19.89 16.18 14.37 19.21 15.47 15.47 15.13 14.16 19.10 16.12
(13.08) (12.63) (13.08) (12.68) (12.24) (12.83) (11.84) (12.77) (12.24) (12.01) (12.34) (12.14)
1986-1987




Standard Deviations in parentheses 
  31Table 3. Metropolitan Lima: Probability of Working in a Unionized Firm 
Probit coefficients and marginal effects 
 
Coeffs. Marg. effects Coeffs. Marg. effects Coeffs. Marg. effects Coeffs. Marg. effects Coeffs. Marg. effects Coeffs. Marg. effects
Married 0.122 0.048 0.057 0.016 0.084 0.034 -0.002 0.000 -0.082 -0.009 -0.116 -0.005
(2.49)** (0.92) (2.19)** (0.04) (2.09)** (2.48)**
Male -0.184 -0.073 -0.003 -0.001 -0.064 -0.025 0.198 0.034 0.147 0.017 0.282 0.010
(2.58)*** (0.05) (0.85) (3.03)*** (4.14)*** (6.39)***
Blue collar worker 0.375 0.146 0.612 0.194 0.252 0.100 0.469 0.099 0.292 0.039 0.334 0.016
(6.07)*** (7.71)*** (5.24)*** (7.16)*** (6.77)*** (5.24)***
Public sector 0.879 0.320 0.571 0.181 1.157 0.410 0.897 0.226 0.986 0.199 0.793 0.062
(9.40)*** (6.24)*** (10.50)*** (11.77)*** (13.80)*** (8.47)***
Secondary education 0.007 0.003 -0.201 -0.048 -0.083 -0.025 -0.281 -0.047 0.224 0.008 0.115 0.003
(0.07) (1.82)* (0.93) (2.97)*** (3.46)*** (1.40)
Higher education 0.238 0.094 -0.009 -0.002 0.078 0.025 -0.198 -0.035 0.709 0.043 0.392 0.013
(1.34) (0.06) (0.43) (1.49) (10.33)*** (4.23)***
Potential experience 0.042 0.013 0.003 0.001 0.034 0.011 -0.002 0.000 0.027 0.001 0.007 0.000
(7.27)*** (0.42) (7.89)*** (0.40) (5.80)*** (1.30)
Potential experience squared -0.042 -0.016 -0.002 0.000 -0.028 -0.011 -0.001 0.000 -0.039 -0.006 -0.017 -0.001
(4.06)*** (0.11) (3.55)*** (0.12) (4.65)*** (1.60)
Firm of 20 to 49 workers 0.538 0.170 0.677 0.176 0.537 0.032
(5.37)*** (8.00)*** (5.94)***
Medium size firm 1.011 0.355 1.163 0.357 0.860 0.071
(9.78)*** (13.27)*** (9.77)***
Large firm 1.721 0.609 1.984 0.661 1.370 0.179
(20.18)*** (27.69)*** (17.82)***
Permanent contract 0.447 0.108 0.550 0.077 0.405 0.013
(5.42)*** (8.11)*** (5.89)***
Temporary contract 0.571 0.146 0.570 0.081 0.249 0.007
(5.16)*** (6.62)*** (3.54)***
Part time 0.204 0.059 0.157 0.029 0.242 0.011
(2.61)*** (2.40)** (4.86)***
Tenure 0.030 0.007 0.027 0.004 0.011 0.000
(7.06)*** (7.56)*** (3.70)***
Controls for occupation and industry NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Unionization and employment [salaried/selfemployed] -0.698 -0.1911 -0.618 0.026 0.868 0.8331
 status error correlation (standar error) (0.159)** (0.142) (0.195)**  (0.16) (0.118)*** (0.042)***
Uncensored observations 3811 3811 6724 6724 8089 8089
Wald Chi2 522.3 (9) 1104 (30) 1084.2 (11) 2213 (32) 870 (12) 9357 (33)
1986-1987 1993-1998 1989-1992
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  33Table 4. Metropolitan Lima: Probability of Union Membership for Workers in Unionized Firms 
 
Married 0.053 0.040 0.041 0.094 0.076 0.073
(2.03)* (1.51) (1.54) (2.70)** (2.11)* (1.96)
Male 0.031 0.035 0.041 0.011 0.054 0.087
(1.23) (1.39) (1.53) (0.31) (1.49) (2.29)*
Blue collar worker 0.227 0.256 0.214 0.177 0.237 0.163
(7.25)** (7.96)** (5.42)** (3.59)** (4.50)** (2.41)*
Public sector 0.206 0.174 0.054 0.166 0.108 -0.049
(7.82)** (6.01)** (1.45) (4.42)** (2.48)* (0.83)
Secondary education -0.080 -0.155 -0.115 -0.034 -0.103 -0.048
(1.75) (3.16)** (2.21)* (0.54) (1.58) (0.69)
Higher education -0.114 -0.234 -0.133 -0.021 -0.155 -0.088
(2.34)* (4.47)** (2.26)* (0.30) (2.15)* (1.08)
Firm of 20 to  49 workers -0.129 -0.055 0.145 0.197
(1.25) (0.52) (1.05) (1.34)
Medium size firm -0.186 -0.128 0.099 0.191
(1.87) (1.23) (0.74) (1.35)
Large firm -0.159 -0.105 0.084 0.192
(1.93) (1.19) (0.72) (1.59)
Permanent contract 0.243 0.293 0.158 0.234
(5.05)** (5.44)** (2.71)** (3.38)**
Part time 0.045 0.053 0.137 0.096
(1.40) (1.59) (3.38)** (2.21)*
Tenure 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.021
(9.39)** (9.44)** (8.04)** (8.02)**
Potential experience 0.018 0.005 0.007 0.033 0.018 0.016
(5.84)** (1.56) (2.05)* (7.47)** (3.73)** (3.03)**
Potential experience squared -0.024 -0.020 -0.023 -0.047 -0.038 -0.031
(4.03)** (3.16)** (3.56)** (5.51)** (4.24)** (3.28)**
Controls for occupation and industry NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 2325 2325 2325 1459 1459 1459
Wald Chi2 187.24  (9) 322.51 (15) 335 (29) 92 (10) 204.04 (16) 245.98 (30)
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Number of degrees of freedom of Wald-chi2 in parenthesis
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Table 5. Differences in Means between Firm Performance Indicators of Unionized  
and Non-Unionized Firms 
 
 
L <= 9 9 < L <= 49 49 < L <= 99 L >99
Non Union 1.155 1.238 1.567 1.476
(-3.456) (2.476) (2.385) (1.590)
Union 1.339 2.078 2.074
(1.465) (2.878) (2.233)
t - test 4.79 ** 11.6 0** 23.33 **
Non Union 0.853 0.909 1.479 1.178
(1.628) (2.016) (2.245) (1.450)
Union 0.986 2.163 1.909
(1.455) (2.906) (3.543)
t - test 4.42 ** 15.94 ** 19.62 **
Non Union 1121 1263 1309 1184
(1635) (2408) (1760) (1191)
Union 1514 1877 2564
(2366) (1919) (4334)
t - test 11.35 ** 18.09 ** 31.39 **
Non Union 0.588 0.555 0.493 0.509
(0.223) (0.255) (0.289) (0.239)
Union 0.586 0.561 0.561
(0.260) (0.280) (0.216)
t - test 11.05 ** 11.51 ** 14.69 **
Non Union 0.020 0.097 0.082 0.123
(1651) (0.292) (0.383) (0.295)
Union 0.071 -0.071 0.002
(0.363) (0.480) (0.342)
t - test -8.68 ** -19.99 ** -27.34 **
Non Union 95608 102659 101878 104516
(118458) (220543) (118731) (98833)
Union 87541 124351 149301
(135968) (111421) (172247)
t - test -6.96 ** 10.68 ** 21.88 **
Non Union 150.362 289.432 386.755 468.384
(170.77) (268.63) (319.22) (376.384)
Union 405.201 579.124 790.172
(293.60) (419.45) (882.36)
t - test 48.58 ** 30.88 ** 34.97 **
Non Union 449.746 858.131 1339.56 1518.508
(403.84) (833.62) (1357.44) (1016.85)
Union 1083.681 1606.186 2656.139
(868.05) (1149.44) (4796.15)







Gross value of production
by worker (S/. of 1994)
Firm Size
Value of  physical assets










-  Significance level: * 5%, ** 1% 
-  t-statistic for Ho: Difference of means 
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  35Figure 6.  Impact of Unions on Value of Gross Production per Worker * 
 












































                  Panel B                 Panel C                                Panel D 
















































































* The within-firm rates of unionization (or union intensity) go from 1 to 5 and are respectively ]0-20], ]20,30], ]30-40], ]40-50] and 50% or more employees unionized. 
Only firms with a union are included.  
       
  36Table 6. Unionization and Firm Performance 
Dependent variable: Production by total employment 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7
Union  (Yes=1, No=0) -27.6027 -28.4019 * -38.2798 ** -23.4725 -14.6469 -16.5799 12.5524
(1.923) (2.070) (2.819) (1.920) (1.199) (1.372) (0.59)
Union* Size2  43.4929 * 42.8481 * 38.8574 * 1.1099 -3.5900 -1.4632 -30.0872
(2.464) (2.450) (2.209) (0.062) (0.206) (0.085) (-1.39)
Union * Size3 70.5552 ** 65.4049 ** 58.6774 ** 7.8446 0.1644 -1.5464 -30.8378
(3.831) (3.682) (3.277) (0.422) (0.009) (0.085) (-1.17)
Year 1995 14.1590 20.0657 19.4899 24.5273 * 18.4540 18.5541 14.2064 **
(1.133) (1.612) (1.571) (2.089) (1.571) (1.580) (2.77)
Year 1996 6.4075 14.0054 12.7019 14.3964 9.3453 9.3175
(0.530) (1.163) (1.051) (1.277) (0.832) (0.830)
Industry concentration index 1.1623 ** 1.1243 ** 0.9766 ** 1.0718 ** 1.2273 ** 0.3835
(5.527) (5.437) (4.930) (5.531) (5.825) (1.59)
Age of the firm  (years) 0.9939 ** 0.5658 0.3344 0.4290 1.0133
(3.082) (1.677) (1.000) (1.231) (0.31)
Capital labor ratio 20.6923 ** 20.5274 ** 20.1666 ** 9.8792 **
(6.183) (6.147) (6.030) (3.61)
White collar wage bill ( 10
-3 ) 13.1650 12.0389 11.7461 -4.2742 **
(1.846) (1.803) (1.764) (-2.90)
Exports / output 156.0332 ** 162.9561 ** 159.1394 ** -36.1010
(3.274) (3.414) (3.314) (-0.81)
Imports  in the firm's  4-digit  SIC industry (%) 1369.9659 ** 1537.3516 ** 1574.3730 **
(2.719) (2.849) (2.92)
Advertising as percentage of  total sales 472.9611 ** 451.4623 ** -330.1033 *
(3.316) (3.117) (-2.12)
Sector fixed effects YES
Firm fixed effects YES
Constant 104.0862 ** 48.5995 ** 28.9413 -5.5618 -18.2522 67.2138 55.6982
(10.631) (3.610) (1.905) (0.391) (1.353) (1.719) (0.62)
Observations 1030 1030 1030 1006 1004 1004 1004
F 3.200 9.100 8.960 27.370 25.150 18.490 4.370
Prob > F       0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rho 0.8036
F test that all ui=0 7.90
Prob > F       0.000
R-squared 0.0154 0.0506 0.058 0.216 0.234 0.242 0.046  
 
Notes: 
-  White test was applied to check for heteroskedasticity.  
-  In models 4, 5, and 6 Newey-West standard errors are reported. 
-  Size 1       L ≤ 9 (control category);  Size 2  9 < L ≤ 49; Size 3  L ≥ 49 Table 7. Unionization and Firm performance 
Dependent variable: Production by total employment 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7
Within firm union density -53.6279 ** -56.3851 ** -66.4230 ** -41.6226 ** -29.0291 * -30.0998 * 50.8911
(3.372) (3.613) (4.112) (3.321) (2.345) (2.398) (1.45)
Percentage unionized * Size2  83.5006 ** 88.7422 ** 72.8800 * 1.2599 2.2565 2.7024 -3.8937
(2.611) (2.693) (2.156) (0.037) (0.070) (0.085) (-0.08)
Percentage unionized * Size3 176.8531 ** 161.0282 ** 139.6397 ** 36.7403 31.3961 26.1915 61.8592
(4.307) (3.982) (3.348) (1.011) (0.880) (0.740) (1.30)
Year 1995 14.0695 19.7856 19.2208 24.4463 * 18.4412 18.5117 13.1916 **
(1.134) (1.599) (1.557) (2.082) (1.568) (1.573) (2.58)
Year 1996 8.3775 15.5143 13.9327 14.5197 9.6054 9.5081
(0.702) (1.305) (1.167) (1.297) (0.861) (0.853)
Industry concentration index 1.1412 ** 1.1095 ** 0.9701 ** 1.0656 ** 1.2203 ** 0.3857
(5.447) (5.382) (4.898) (5.509) (5.803) (1.60)
Age of the firm  (years) 0.8814 ** 0.4299 0.1856 0.2705 -33.1453
(2.696) (1.282) (0.559) (0.781) (-0.75)
Capital labor ratio 20.5505 ** 20.2831 ** 19.9601 ** 9.3545 **
(6.166) (6.111) (6.003) (3.40)
White collar wage bill  ( 10
-3 ) 12.8300 11.6477 11.3264 -4.0798 **
(1.841) (1.795) (1.753) (-2.78)
Exports / output 152.0977 ** 158.9002 ** 154.6562 ** -33.1453
(3.258) (3.399) (3.287) (-0.75)
Imports in the firm's  4-digit  SIC industry (%) 1385.3154 ** 1555.1054 ** 1516.4570 **
(2.746) (2.884) (2.82)
Advertising as percentage of  total sales 463.4382 ** 439.5453 ** -325.8920 **
(3.200) (2.970) (-2.10)
Sector fixed effects YES
Firm fixed effects YES
Constant 103.2841 ** 49.0048 ** 30.8234 * -3.4072 -15.9255 61.4497 -0.4083
(10.921) (3.751) (2.031) (0.242) (1.199) (1.445) (0.00)
Observations 1030 1030 1030 1006 1004 1004 1004
F 4.570 10.050 9.560 27.320 25.090 18.400 4.860
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rho 0.8121
F test that all ui=0 7.99
Prob > F       0.000
R-squared 0.022 0.056 0.062 0.215 0.233 0.241 0.047  
 
Notes: 
-  White test was applied to check for heteroskedasticity.  
-  In models 4, 5, and 6 Newey-West standard errors are reported. 
-  Size 1       L ≤ 9 (control category);  Size 2  9 < L ≤ 49; Size 3  L ≥ 49 
  38Figure 7. Impact of Unions over Capital Labor Ratio* 
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* The within-firm rates of unionization (or union intensity) go from 1 to 5 and are respectively ]0-20], ]20,30], ]30-40], ]40-50] and 50% or more employees unionized. We include in this analysis only firms with a 
union.  
  39Figure 8. Impact of Unions over Return on Sales (ROS) 
 







































































































  40Table 8. Unionization and Firm Performance 
Dependent variable: return on sales (ROS) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8
Union  (Yes=1, No=0) -0.1904 ** -0.1896 ** -0.1865 ** -0.1737 ** -0.1633 ** -0.1642 ** -0.1551 ** -0.1747 *
(4.884) (4.884) (4.666) (4.332) (4.148) (4.187) (3.975) (2.508)
Union * Size 2 0.1294 * 0.1259 * 0.1266 * 0.1274 * 0.1216 * 0.1272 * 0.1276 * 0.0246
(2.426) (2.370) (2.380) (2.403) (2.348) (2.467) (2.494) (0.687)
Union * Size3 0.1056 * 0.0969 0.0975 0.1014 0.1072 * 0.1097 * 0.1037 * 0.0717
(1.964) (1.807) (1.816) (1.894) (2.046) (2.102) (2.002) (1.628)
Year 1995 -0.1449 ** -0.1364 ** -0.1364 ** -0.1362 ** -0.1412 ** -0.1452 ** -0.1467 **
(4.669) (4.423) (4.423) (4.428) (4.667) (4.778) (4.866)
Year 1996 -0.1507 ** -0.1393 ** -0.1391 ** -0.1378 ** -0.1361 ** -0.1404 ** -0.1395 **
(4.965) (4.575) (4.565) (4.537) (4.545) (4.669) (4.678)
Industry concentration index (CI 4) 0.0013 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0012 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0008
(3.168) (3.183) (2.967) (3.375) (3.305) (3.276) (1.113)
Age of the firm  (years) -0.0002 0.0000 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0573 **
(0.333) (0.022) (0.849) (0.543) (0.726) (4.309)
Total Employment (10
-2) -0.0162 ** -0.0186 ** -0.0196 ** -0.0197 ** -0.0031
(2.807) (3.134) (3.319) (3.348) (0.228)
Capital labor ratio -0.0409 ** -0.0399 ** -0.0394 ** -0.0450 **
(9.199) (9.003) (8.944) (4.681)
White collar wage bill ( 10
-3 ) 0.0140 ** 0.0133 ** 0.1320 ** -0.0018
(3.176) (2.983) (2.991) (0.348)
Exports / output 0.0727 0.0882 0.0897 0.1828
(1.293) (1.572) (1.609) (1.356)
Imports  in the firm's  4-digit  SIC industry (%) -0.253 -0.0419 -1.4775
(0.285) (0.046) (0.820)
Advertising as percentage of  total sales 1.1545 ** 0.8917 ** -0.5088
(3.555) (2.697) (1.004)
Sector fixed effects YES
Firm fixed effects YES
Constant 0.2091 ** 0.1469 ** 0.1518 ** 0.1597 ** 0.1635 ** 0.1621 ** -0.4136 * 1.6975 **
(9.193) (4.899) (4.547) (4.782) (4.876) (4.791) (2.213) (4.672)
Observations 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108
F 11.01 10.92 9.37 9.24 15.41 14.23 11.18 5.38
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rho 0.936
F test that all ui=0 2.780
Prob > F       0.000
R-squared 0.050 0.056 0.056 0.063 0.137 0.148 0.167 0.083  
 
Notes: 
-  White test was applied to check for heteroskedasticity.  
-  Size 1       L ≤ 9 (control category) 
Size 2  9 < L ≤ 49 
Size 3  L ≥ 49 
  41Table 9. Unionization and Firm Performance 
Dependent variable: return on sales (ROS) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
3 model 1 model 2 model  model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8
Within firm union density -0.3562 ** -0.3561 ** -0.3480 ** -0.3336 ** -0.2850 ** -0.2818 ** -0.2905 ** -0.2729 *
(4.818) (4.837) (4.619) (4.438) (3.875) (3.845) (3.993) (2.336)
Percentage unionized * Size 2 0.2358 * 0.2250 * 0.2267 * 0.2266 * 0.1991 * 0.2118 * 0.2162 * 0.0313
(2.276) (2.179) (2.194) (2.202) (1.984) (2.119) (2.185) (0.435)
Percentage unionized * Size 3 0.1342 0.1233 0.1246 0.1239 0.1241 0.1329 0.1353 0.0388
(1.248) (1.151) (1.163) (1.162) (1.192) (1.280) (1.316) (0.441)
Year 1995 -0.1377 ** -0.1287 ** -0.1287 ** -0.1281 ** -0.1304 ** -0.1343 ** -0.1365 **
(4.670) (4.361) (4.360) (4.358) (4.507) (4.615) (4.737)
Year 1996 -0.1392 ** -0.1290 ** -0.1285 ** -0.1259 ** -0.1213 ** -0.1256 ** -0.1277 **
(4.798) (4.438) (4.417) (4.346) (4.243) (4.369) (4.848)
Industry concentration index 0.0013 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0012 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0014 ** 0.0008
(3.205) (3.234) (3.000) (3.412) (3.333) (3.338) (1.108)
Age of the firm  (years) -0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0485 **
(0.511) (0.093) (0.802) (0.458) (0.838) (3.805)
Total Employment (10
-2) -0.0182 ** -0.0201 ** -0.0211 ** -0.0209 ** -0.0097
(3.219) (3.423) (3.608) (3.596) (0.702)
Capital labor ratio -0.0401 ** -0.0393 ** -0.0386 ** -0.0419 **
(9.010) (8.831) (8.749) (4.339)
White collar wage bill  ( 10
-3 ) 0.0133 ** 0.0126 ** 0.0126 ** -0.0023
(3.016) (2.830) (2.867) (0.443)
Exports / output 0.0622 0.0778 0.0784 0.1692
(1.105) (1.383) (1.407) (1.254)
Imports in the firm's  4-digit  SIC industry (%) -0.2654 -0.0524 -1.7903
(0.299) (0.058) (0.994)
Advertising as percentage of  total sales 1.1092 ** 0.8277 * -0.4966
(3.405) (2.499) (0.979)
Sector fixed effects YES
Firm fixed effects YES
Constant 0.1992 ** 0.1366 ** 0.1441 ** 0.1519 ** 0.1544 ** 0.1536 ** -0.4783 ** 1.4545 **
(9.184) (4.690) (4.412) (4.658) (4.708) (4.633) (2.574) (4.188)
Observations 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080
F 11.450 11.330 9.740 9.890 15.440 14.140 11.340 5.210
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rho 0.916
F test that all ui=0 2.760
Prob > F       0.000
R-squared 0.0494 0.0582 0.0584 0.0672 0.1370 0.1471 0.1689 0.0810  
 
Notes: 
-  White test was applied to check for heteroskedasticity.  
-  Size 1       L ≤ 9 (control category) 
Size 2  9 < L ≤ 49 
Size 3  L ≥ 49 
  42Table A.1 
Number of Observations  
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) 
1/. 
 












1998 917 12  
 








No. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Rate of return on sales 1634 0.074 0.344
Gross value of production over L (10
-3) 1659 110.271 218.769
Union dummy (yes=1, no=0) 1741 0.228 0.42
Within firm union density 
1/. 1741 0.099 0.207
Industry concentration index 
2/. 1741 44.695 25.031
Employment  (10
-2) 1741 0.712 1.535
Experience (years in the business) 1741 23.638 14.972
Capital labor ratio 1690 1.143 2.275
Exports/gross value of production 1725 0.045 0.163
Advertising expenditures / sales 1741 0.011 0.03
White collar real wages (10
-3) 1732 1.186 1.904
% of imports in the SIC of the firm
 3/. 1741 0.009 0.011
Dummy for 1995 1741 0.335 0.472
Dummy for 1996 1741 0.333 0.471  
 
      1/. Percentage of the firms’ workers that belong to a union 
      2/. Sum of the four largest firms’ market shares 
      3/. Imports / gross value of production 
 
 